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INTRODUCTIONTheway in which ability influences earnings, either directly or by
its impact on the productivity of schooling, is currently not well
understood. Measurements of specific abilities (e.g., the enviable
capacity to succeed consistently in obtaining large grants and com-
fortable per diems) and general ability (e.g., measured IQ) are the
product of genetic, environmental, and experiential factors that are
difficult to disentangle. For many important models it is probably
unnecessary to break down measured ability into its components.
Suppose that the prospective earnings E of an individual can be
expressed as a function of measured ability A at time to,aset of
NOTE:This chapter has been neither reviewed nor approved by the directors
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. The project underlying it has
been supported by funds from the U.S. Office of Education channeled through
the National Research Council. Research was carried out with the aid of grants
from the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and the National Science
Foundation and with the general funds of the National Bureau. Computer time
was provided by the University of Minnesota.
This chapter significantly extends (and heavily cannibalizes) an earlier
version published in the May 1971 supplement to the AmericanEconomic
Review.The empirical portion of this study would have been impossible with-
out the generous cooperation of those assembling the important primary data.
I am indebted to D. C. Rogers for allowing me to use his basic data tape. I am
also indebted to Torsten Husén for allowing me to use the remarkable data
on Swedish males from Malmö and to Ingemar Fagerlind for coordinating the
collection of the Swedish earnings data. The American Institutes of Research
prepared the Project Talent data tape. And Robert Thorndike was most co-
operative in making available to the NBER his massive collection of data from
1955 on.
Comments by Finis Welch on the original version were perceptive and
valuable. Computations were carried out by J. Sanguinetty, M. Sternfeld, and
A. L. Norman. Norman also developed a very useful program for estimating
missing observations that greatly facilitated the Project Talent calculations.
Margareta Forselius and Karlis Goppers provided much assistance with the
Swedish data.
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otherpersonal characteristics P0 atadditional schooling or other
investment to increase future earnings S, and time for t￿
E(t)=F(A0,P0,S,t) (54)
A,, and P0 specify the initial state of the person at to.Although
A0 and P,, may include simple, easily measured factors (e.g., race
or sex) as well as complicated functionals of factors operating be-
fore t,,,itmay be that A0 and P,, adequately summarize the initial
state for the purpose of analyzing how S affects the earnings pro.
file E(t). If this condition is satisfied, so that a complete biography
of the individual from conception until t0 is unnecessary, a value-
added analysis of the schooling increment S is feasible.
This study takes a slightly less agnostic view of the role that
ability plays in determining the earnings stream E(t). The measure
of kisa test score (or set of test scores). Loose hypotheses can
readily be developed on how A,, is related to E(t) for additional
schooling after t,, (including S0). The main interest in these
hypotheses stems largely from our ignorance of how schooling af-
fects the earnings stream. If we reason that many people regard
schooling as an important way of increasing their prospective
earnings, we expect to find (and, in fact, do find) a significant
tendency for earnings to rise with the level of schooling attainment.
This discovery throws little light on the "technology" by which
schooling augments subsequent earnings. An analysis of the role
of ability, however, gives some insights into this black box.
The following section discusses some hypotheses on the roles of
ability and schooling as they affect earnings. Later, some of these
hypotheses are tested, using several cohorts of individuals for
whom data are available on ability, achievement, other personal
and background characteristics, and earnings.
SOMEAbilityis usually defined as the power to do something. Many of the
HYPOTHESEStests designed to measure ability have been developed in an educa-
N
ANDtional context where the relevant power is the capacity to learn and
EARIN
mastercognitive tools. Learning through formal schooling and
learning those things which increase a person's economic produc-
tivity, however, are not identical, although one would expect an
empirically significant positive correlation between the two. There
are, in fact, several well-documented empirical relationships that
also point to a positive association between earnings and measuredAbility and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings125
ability.An empirically significant positive relationship exists both
between level of schooling attainment and earnings after people
have been working for a few years (see Tables 5-2, 5-7, and 5-9,
for example) and between measured ability and level of schooling
attainment (see Tables 5-2, 5-5, 5-7, and 5-9). Our knowledge of
the technological relationship between schooling and earnings is
meager, but this lack has not impeded the making of sweeping
conjectures. Several output components of schooling which may
affect earnings have been suggested (or asserted). A casual catalog
includes (1)specific skills to perform well-defined tasks, (2)
general cognitive skills that enable people to locate and handle in-
formation more efficiently, (3) "social skills" that increase the
capacity to deal with (or manipulate) others, (4) development of
greater rational foresight and self-discipline, and (5) conditioning
to certain attitudes (e.g., obeying orders, punctuality) and to the
performance of routine tasks that increase personal productivity
in modern economic organizations. From this list it seems likely
that measured ability is associated primarily with general cognitive
skills and with the capacity to acquire some of the more complex
specific mental skills. Since these skills (and skill levels) depend
upon both schooling and measured ability, one expects a positive
interaction of schooling and ability on earnings, unless, of course,
these skills have no effect on earnings.'
To my knowledge, neither learning theory nor economic theory
has been developed to the point where a powerful theory of the
earnings profile can emerge. Even so, interpreting ability broadly
as "learning power" immediately suggests several simple hypoth-
eses. Consider the earnings profiles of a cohort of people with the
same schooling attainment. If people with greater ability learn the
same job skills as others, but more quickly, their earnings profiles
will rise more rapidly than the profiles of those with less ability as
long as their economic productivity is increasing more rapidly.
If full job competence is attainable by people of lower and higher
ability, the influence of ability disappears after a period long enough
to allow those with lower ability to attain full productivity.
11t is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate the other hypotheses on
schooling outputs and earnings. Some of them appear to be difficult to eval-
uate because data for observing marginal changes are not available. For ex-
ample, children are exposed to substantial experience related to conditioning
of certain attitudes before they reach the legal age for leaving school. If further
schooling has little effect on this dimension, then it will not be easy to measure
directly the impact of schooling on earnings from this source.Education, income, and human behavior126
Onthe other hand, differential ability may limit the complexity
of skills that people are able to master. In this case, an ability effect
on earnings can persist over time as long as more complex skills
yield higher earnings. If one considers different schooling levels,
it seems plausible that persistent ability differentials in earnings
should become more important at higher levels of schooling. At the
lowest levels of schooling attainment, jobs consist largely of well-
defined tasks that do not require great cognitive ability, and out-
put is easily measured in these jobs. At high levels of education,
more jobs have no obvious upper limit, in terms of the degree of
skill that is economically productive. Since the efficiency with
which people can find and assemble economically relevant infor-
mation depends significantly on cognitive capacity and skills, there
is no reason why the marginal returns to such skills should become
negligible in many "high-level" jobs.
Attempts to understand the relative slope of the logarithm of the
earnings profile of high- and low-ability people are not carried far
by a priori argument (see Appendix C).
Initial earnings of people first entering the labor force could
have a positive, zero, or negative simple correlation with ability.
A positive correlation could indicate that those with higher ability
are immediately more productive and that employers can observe
this fact at the time of hiring. In this case, there is no guarantee
that the percentage rate at which high-ability people acquire
specific job skills exceeds the rate for less-skilled people. A low
positive or zero simple correlation between initial earnings and
ability could reflect the fact that employers have imprecise informa-
tion about the current and future productivity of new members of
the labor force at the time they are hired. After employees have
gained experience, the reassessment of their productivity and the
higher speed with which the more able workers acquire specific job
skills should combine so that the percentage rate of increase in earn-
ings will be higher for those with more ability (at least initially).
A negative simple correlation between initial earnings and ability
could arise if ability is a strong complement of on-the-job training
which must be paid for by reduced initial earnings. In this case,
at some point in time the relative earnings of high-ability people
would have to rise more rapidly than those of less-able people to
make worthwhile the former's greater investment in training.
In addition to determining the relationship between earnings,
schooling, and ability at different points on the earnings profile, itAbility and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings 127
isalso useful to consider how these factors are related to lifetime
(discounted) earnings. Even if people have identical ability and
schooling, the growth of individual productivity over time may
differ between jobs. In the absence of nonpecuniary occupational
tastes, there would be a tendency for entry rates to different occupa-
lions to be governed by the condition that they lead to the same
(net) present value of earnings. Thus significant dispersion of earn-
ings at different points along the earnings profile is in principle
compatible with relatively little dispersion in the net present values.
Since people presumably take into account prospective profiles of
earnings over time and not merely the earnings for a single year
when they make decisions about schooling and occupation, the
attempt to establish statistically the determinants of the present
value of earnings (or closely related functions of the earnings
profile) plays an important part in understanding these decisions.
The preceding remarks on ability and how it may affect the earnings
profile also imply that there is likely to be a positive correlation be-
tween ability and discounted earnings.
We consider next the relationship between ability and discounted
earnings for different levels of schooling. A number of expository
and statistical models express earnings (usually for a single year
after earnings profiles have flattened out) as a linear function of
schooling, ability, and an uncorrelated random variable:2
Y=f30+/31S+/32A+u (5-2)
This relationship does not seem plausible. It implies that school-
ing and ability are perfect substitutes in determining earnings
(because of the linear form). More important, it implies that the
marginal product of additional schooling is independent of ability
(because of separability). The latter assumption is implausible for
two well-known reasons. First, there is the systematic tendency of
higher-ability people (as measured by IQ or other tests) to acquire
more schooling than others. Second, the opportunity cost of forgone
earnings is a large part (more than half) of the cost of obtaining
higher levels of schooling for most people (Schultz, 1968). Equation
(5-2) implies that the opportunity cost of acquiring additional
schooling is greater for more able people; yet this schooling yields
2See, for example, Hansen, Weisbrod, andScanlon(1970) or Ashenfelter and
Mooney (1968).Education, income, and human behavior128
thesame increment to earnings to everyone, independently of
ability. Thus the economic incentive to acquire additional school-
ing implied by this model is greater for those with less ability, and
their expected rate of return would be higher.
An alternative specification that captures the opportunity cost of
acquiring schooling in a more plausible way replaces the level of
earnings Y by log Y in Eq. (5-2). In this formulation, the level of
earnings for people with different ability increases equiproportion-
ally with schooling. Even this specification, however, provides no
economic rationale for the strong tendency of people with greater
ability to acquire more formal education. Table 5-1 (which may
contain some response bias) shows the strength of this relationship
for male high school graduates of 1960. Although the sons of high-
income families are more likely to enter college at all ability levels,
the ability—college entrance relationship is very strong within family
income classes. Tables 5-5, 5-7, and 5-9 show the same positive
association between measured ability and terminal level of school-
ing.
Consider a simple model in which education is acquired solely
to increase earnings and in which perfect foresight and a perfect
capital market for funds to support schooling are assumed. For this
model, equilibrium is attained when the flows of people of different
ability to different terminal levels of schooling lead to relative wages
such that net present values of earnings are the same for people
with the same ability but different schooling attainment. In such a
world, regressions of the logarithm of earnings on ability within
each schooling class would result in coefficients of ability that are
roughly the same for different schooling levels. However, the very






















90—99.9 3.7 5.1 7.7 14.5 16.1
75—89.9 13.5 10.4 19.5 27.0 21.7
50—74.9 25.3 23.0 40.2 41.8 51.2
25—49.9 39.4 442 59.1 70.3 78.9
0—24.9 83.5 72.5 77.0 81.6 87.6
SOURCE:Project Talent, The American High-School Student. Final Report for
Coop. Project 635, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, 1964. Tables 11—18.Ability and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings129
might well result in coefficients of ability that rise with education.
The hypotheses of this section are examined empirically below.
TESTINGThefour samples of cohort data used to study the ability-school-
ABILITYAND . . . . .
EARNINGSmg-earningsrelationship are descnbed in detail in Appendix A.
HYPOTHESESThesamples differ substantially in size, in the populations from
which they are drawn, and in supplementary variables. The small
sample of Rogers has been studied more thoroughly than the others,
but parallel calculations with the other samples confirm, qualify,
and extend these results.
Results fromThecalculations from the important sample obtained by Daniel C.
Rogers's DataRogersare based on a survey of 343 white males, primarily from
Connecticut, who were eighth graders when tested for IQ in 1935.
Table 5-2 shows mean values (and standard deviations of back-
ground variables) and the logarithm of earnings for different school-
ing levels at five-year intervals from 1950 through 1965. The five
schooling levels are E1, high school nongraduates; E2, high school
graduates; E3, college nongraduates; E4, college graduates with one
degree (and perhaps additional study); and E5, holders of two or
more degrees. The intervention of World War II may make the
E3 group atypically heterogeneous since it includes men who
started college shortly before the war, entered the military, and
did not return to college thereafter. It also includes those college
dropouts who initially entered college after completing military
service, attracted in part by GI Bill subsidies that made out-of-
pocket costs of college attendance relatively low. The motivations
causing men to enter college but not graduate are diverse in any
period, and they were probably unusually mixed in this sample.
Therefore, one should interpret the results for this subgroup with
caution.
The background variables used in the analysis of Rogers's data
are subpopulation dummy variables for social class (SCH 1
for the highest two social classes, out of five, and SCL =1for the
lowest two), religion (RC1 for Catholic background and RJ =
1for Jewish background), private school attendance (PS = 1 for
precollege private schooling), and marital status (NM =1if not
married in 1965). No attempt will be made inthischapter to ra-
tionalize the precise role played by these variables in the earnings










































































* Numbersin parentheses are standard deviations.
SOURCE:Data tape of D. C. Rogers.
ability (IQ). They do, however, help to prevent an exaggeration
of the role of ability in the regressions, and they also help to elimi-
nate some sources of differential earnings that make it difficult to
estimate an ability effect from the small samples that are available.
In Table 5-2 all the mean earnings estimates increase with school-
ing except in 1950, when the E5 group had very little postschool
experience. (There is one trivial reversal in 1955.) The standard
deviations of the logs of earnings are substantially lower for E1
andE2levels,which suggests, in principle, that weighted regres-
sions should be used if all schooling classes are pooled in one re-
gression. The table shows the positive association of IQ and school-
ing attainment, which suggests that schooling and IQ have a posi-
tive interaction on earnings—a hypothesis proposed above. Marital
status is not systematically related to schooling attainment, but is
included in the empirical work because of the strong tendency for
unmarried men to have substantially lower earnings than married
men. The entire set of background variables based on Rogers's data
is frequently used in regressions in this chapter and is denoted by
in the following discussion and tables.
The size of the schooling subgroups in this sample is small, lead-
ing to large standard errors in many of the parameter estimates.
Even so, there are some suggestive patterns that broadly conform
to some of the hypotheses, although they cannot be confirmed with
high statistical significance.
Several theoretical and empirical arguments in the preceding
section explain why schooling and ability are unlikely to be perfect







evidence for this by showing the linear regressions of 1965 earnings
and discounted lifetime earnings (at 4 percent) on IQ and the back-
ground variables X*.
The pattern of IQ coefficients (except in E3) is broadly consistent
with the belief that the coefficient of ability increases with educa-
tional level in linear regressions. IQ is only trivially related to
earnings for the lowest schooling level, but appears to make a
moderate empirical difference in earnings as the schooling level
rises. An approximate chi-square test of the statistical hypothesis
that the 1965 IQ coefficients are equal across educational classes
(excluding the peculiar E3 class) indicates that the probability of
the null hypothesis is less than This result and the array of
IQ coefficients in Table 5-3 suggest that there is positive interaction
between IQ and educational level and that the linear model is mis-
specified because it does not allow for interaction when educational
levels are pooled in one regression equation.
The low coefficient for the E3 group (some college) is anomalous.
This result may be sample-specific, for historical reasons already
mentioned, or there may be some unobservable factor that leads to
self-selection by those who terminate their schooling at this level.
Still it is unclear why the effect of IQ on earnings should be this
weak.
3thistest, a weighted mean was constructed from the IQ coefficients of the
1965 regressions in Table 5-2. Let= (l/Jpj), where is the
estimated standard error of $,theIQ coefficient of schooling group E1. Let the
weighted mean= Then — is approximately chi-
square with three degrees of freedom (for the four educational classes). In this







































NOTE:Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
SOURCE:Author's computations are from data in Rogers sample.
Table 5-4 contains regressions of the logarithm of earnings on
IQ and the background variables X* and is designed to explore the
hypothesis that IQ differentials affect earnings equiproportionally
at all educational levels. As before, IQ continues to have a very
weak association with earnings of high school nongraduates, and
we also get the continued anomaly of a small coefficient for E3.
Nonetheless, the pattern of IQ coefficients across schooling levels
for 1965 earnings, and for discounted lifetime earnings, is consis-
tent with the argument that ability should tend to increase earnings
at least proportionally for increasing levels of schooling. Indeed,
the IQ coefficient on 1965 earnings and discounted earnings
appears to jump substantially for the highest educational level,
a suggestive result, although the difference in the E4 and E5 co-
efficients in this small sample is not statistically significant.
To facilitate comparisons with other samples in which different
tests are used to measure ability, the product of the IQ coefficient
and one standard deviation of the test score for each schooling
cohort is shown, in brackets, in the 1965 column of Table 5-4.
Since the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of earnings
and since the standardized IQ coefficient is usually small, the latter
can be interpreted as being approximately equal to the relative in-
crease in earnings associated with a change of one standard devia-
tion in the IQ.
In order to study how IQ affects earnings for a given schooling
level, regressions can be run using as dependent variables the dif-

















































































* Numbersin parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients and standard errors are
multipled by 100. The bracketed figures are the product of the IQ coefficient and
one standard deviation of IQ, from Table 5-1, and were notmultipliedby 100.
The 1965 IQ coefficient for £5, for example, implies a 1.32% rise in earnings
with a one-point rise in IQ, and since the standard deviation of IQ is 10 for
thismagnitude of IQ change implies approximately a 13.2% change in earnings.
t The pooled regression includes the background variables and the dummies for
educational level.
SOURCE:Author's computations are from data in Rogers sample.
efficient of an independent variable can then be interpreted as the
percentage change in earnings over time associated with the
variable. The coefficients of IQ that would be obtained from this
calculation can be read directly from Table 5-4 by taking the dif-
ference in the coefficients for any pair of years. For E5(twoor more
college degrees), IQ appears to have an effect that increases sub-
stantially over time. This tendency of ability to become more im-
portant as labor force experience increases is pervasive, but is
weaker at lower levels of schooling. Although occupational informa-
tion was unavailable, the larger rise in ability effects over time
among the highly educated might be due in part to substantial
earnings by high-ability professional men, whose earnings may
increase rapidly after their lengthy training is completed. (The
initial small negative correlations of IQ with earnings for this group
in 1950 and 1955 may also be due partly to the late labor market
entry of these professionals.Education, income, and human behavior134
Onthe basis of Rogers's sample, what conclusions can be drawn
about the important problem of bias in the returns to education
when ability is ignored? It seems to be well established that mean
IQ increases with schooling level. If IQ is positively correlated with
earnings at each schooling level, an earnings differential calculated
by taking the difference in mean earnings for each schooling level
will exaggerate the potential gain for a person of given ability who
acquires more schooling. For the Rogers sample, Table 5-2 in-
dicates that mean IQ is about 13 points higher for, college graduates
than for high school graduates; the corresponding differential in
IQ for college graduates with two degrees over high school grad-
uates is 15 points. The coefficients on IQ for levels E4 and E5 in
Table 5-4, multiplied by the corresponding IQ differentials, imply
that lifetime earnings (discounted at 4 percent) of the average high
school graduate would be 6 percent and 8 percent less than the
earnings of those who attained the E4 and E5 levels, respectively.
A similar calculation based on the 1965 earnings-IQ coefficients
implies that the average high school graduate (who terminated his
education with high school) would earn 13 percent and 18 percent
less than the mean E4 and E5 individuals, respectively. Thus, this
sample indicates the existence of an empirically significant bias in
using earnings differentials to calculate the apparent increase in
earnings for high school graduates who subsequently take one or
more college degrees. Because the IQ-earnings relationship is
negligible for high school nongraduates, there is no overstatement
of the increased earnings of those who actually completed high
school (although there would be an overstatement of the gains to
a person whose ability is that of the mean high school nongraduate).
The sample provides a modest but positive rationalization of the
strong association between schooling attainment and IQ. The dis-
counted lifetime earnings coefficient for those with two or more
degrees is larger in magnitude than the high school coefficient.
The product of the difference in the coefficients and the difference
in the mean IQ's indicates that lifetime discounted earnings in-
crease 5.4 percent more for a person with IQ 117 than for a person
with IQ 102, if both have two degrees.4
4This magnitude of interaction between IQ and schooling is considerably larger
than the 1 percent increase obtained by Rogers (1969, Table 9, P. 115). The
difference arises in part because Rogers used an age-in-school variable that is
correlated with IQ and because of other differences in formulating a statistical
model and handling the data. As explained in App. A., Rogers's sample of 364
was reduced by 21 observations to eliminate individuals with extreme personalAbility and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings135
TheIQ coefficients for high school graduates and for college
graduates with one degree are almost identical for discounted earn-
ings. However, the 1950 IQ coefficient for high school graduates is
quite small in comparison with that for college graduates with one
degree. The small IQ coefficient for high school graduates suggests
that the opportunity cost of earnings while attending college differs
little over a wide range of ability, whereas ability makes a larger
relative difference early in the earnings career of college graduates.
Clearly this provides some incentive for those with higher IQ to
attend college.
ResultsfromTheseresults are based on a sample of about 8,800 white males
theProjectwhowere high school juniors in 1959, when they took ability and TalentData
achievementtests and provided certain background information,
and who in 1966 had full-time employment and responded to a mail
questionnaire. Although most of the college graduates have not
had more than one year of postcollege work experience, and al-
though later points along the earnings profile are not yet available,
it is interesting to compare this large sample with the Rogers evi-
dence. Table 5-5 is analogous to Table 5-1 and provides data on
earnings, weeks worked, and background variables by schooling
level. The five schooling levels are EL high school nongraduates;
high school graduates;college dropouts (with one to two
years of college);college dropouts (with three to four years of
college); andcollege graduates. A number of ability and achieve-
ment variables are available for this sample. The tests included in
the table are COOl (a composite test score which is reported to be
highly correlated with IQ), C004 (a quantitative test-composite
score), R410 (arithmetic computation), and R430 (clerical check-
ing). The background variables include high and low social class
(SC!!' and SCL', obtained from a composite socioeconomic status
variable, P*801, developed by Project Talent), religion (RC = 1 for
Catholic background, and RJ = 1 for Jewish background), non-
public school attendance (PARS = 1 for parochial school atten-
dance in 1959, and PR VS = 1 for private school attendance), not
characteristics. This procedure could lead to some modification of the IQ co-
efficients. Rogers measured social class by a four-valued single variable, where-
as I trichotomized the sample by dummy variables. Finally, my results are
based on coefficients from individual regressions by schooling level to allow for
full interactions with the other variables. Rogers pooled his observations in a
single regression in which the IQ-schooling interaction was allowed (but no
other schooling-level differences). -Education, income, and human behavior136
marriedin 1966 (NM), and a variable for region of school in 1959
(S = 1 for U.S. Office of Education, Region 5—Southeast).5
The logarithmic mean earnings for 1966 are irregularly ordered
with respect to schooling attainment. The mean for high school
nongraduates is slightly larger than the mean for high school grad-
uates. This may reflect a differential response bias favoring non-
graduates with high earnings, although direct evidence is not avail-
able on this point. The differences in the mean of log-weeks worked
are partly responsible for the lower earnings means of theand
schooling levels. If we assume that earnings per week are unaffected
by the number of weeks worked and if we standardize all 1966
earnings to the 3.90 mean of log-weeks worked of theclass,
the five log-earnings figures forthroughare 8.54, 8.47, 8.42,
8.38, and 8.56, respectively.6 This adjustment reduces the differ-
entials between log-earnings of the schooling levels, although only
the rank of college graduate earnings is changed. The ranking is
probably influenced significantly by the productivity gains that
have already been achieved by those in the lower levels of schooling
attainment, and behavior of similar samples suggests that the rank-
5The Project Talent data bank does not include the place of residence of
respondents. The only geographic information readily available is region of
1959 schooling.
61n fact, this adjustment appears to be too large. Within schooling class, the
regression coefficients on log-weeks worked are about .7.I shall not burden
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* Numbersin parentheses are standard deviations.
t Sample sizes for these two educational levels are 63 and 1,854.
SOURCE:Data tape on subsample of high school juniors. Project Talent.Ability and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings137
ing will be altered in favor of those with more schooling in the
future. I intend to test this conjecture in a future study.
The significant tendency of abstract ability (COO! and C004) to
rise with level of schooling parallels the Rogers data. The more
specific skills (R410 and R430) also tend to rise with schooling,
but within schooling level, standard deviations for these variables
are relatively much larger than the mean differences between
schooling levels. The inverse relation between fraction married and
level of schooling in these data is consistent with the young age of
this cohort in 1966. The association (or lack of association) between
the remaining background variables and schooling is also similar
to Rogers's findings.
Regressions are reported for the logarithm of 1966 earnings on
one of the ability or skill variables and X?* _(SCH',SCL', RC,
RJ, PARS, PRVS, NM, 5, LNWK).7 Table 5-6 shows the coeffi-
LNWK (log of weeks worked) is included as an independent vari-
able for two reasons. First, including it makes the results more comparable
with the 1950 calculations from Rogers's data and the Thorndike sample (both
of these give earnings on a full-time equivalent basis). Second, many individuals
with E4 andschooling attainment were relatively new to the labor force
and worked less than a full year (as suggested by the considerably lower mean
value of LNWK for these two groups). As far as this study is concerned, this
source of variation of the log of earnings is largely "noise" at the higher educa-
tional levels.
Including LNWK reduces the magnitude of the ability and skill coefficients
for the three lowest educational levels, but not by enough to greatly change




putation) ing) SCL'SCH' RC RJ NM S PARSPRVS
38 39 .399 .279 .328.016.284.137 .022 .011
(13) (18)
40 40 .314 .283 .331 .015.398.165 .061 .012
(10) (16)
42 41 .169 .465 .315 .041 .462.159 .099 .026
(9) (15)
44 41 .107 .603 .282.062.484.160 .106 .039
(9) (14)
47 42 .113 .621 .266 .078.502.157 .102 .044
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* Numbersin parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients and standard errors are
multiplied by 100. The bracketed figures are the product of the ability or skill co-
efficient and one standard deviation of the corresponding test by schooling level,
and are not multiplied by 100.
For completeness, the 1961 coefficients for the (irst two schooling levels and first
four columns are as follows: El (N =63):.17 (.16); .08 (.25); —.83 (.57); and
—.25(.39). (N= 1854); —.08 (.033); —.07(.037);.05 (.13); and .11 (.089).
t In this column, the other independent variables were LNWK. RC, RJ, and NM.
Other variables more highly correlated with C004 are omitted.
SOURCE:Author's computation from Project Talent sample.
cients and standard error of the different ability and skill measures
and (selectively) the product of the ability or skill coefficient multi-
plied by one standard deviation of the corresponding test measure
for the appropriate schooling level. The COOl coefficient (general-
ability composite) is very weak in its effect at all levels and, in fact,
is negative (but not significant) both for college dropouts with one
or two years of college and for college graduates. The C004 (quanti-
tative composite) is significant and positive for high school and col-
lege graduates (and negative, but insignificant, for college dropouts
with three or four years of college).
This pattern seems broadly consistent with the 1950 results from
Rogers's data. The ability variables have a very weak association
with earnings for high school dropouts. Their influence rises for
high school graduates, declines for college dropouts, and rises
again for college graduates. For all schooling levels, the quantitative
effect of ability differentials on earnings seems to be quite smallAbility and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings139
atearly points along the earnings profile. These results also suggest
that college dropouts differ in some way from high school and col-
lege graduates, and the earnings-ability relationship for them can-
not be interpolated simply from results for high school and college
graduates. Perhaps dropping out reflects differences in motivation,
or perhaps the jobs that dropouts take require specific skills that
are less complementary with general cognitive ability than the skills
required for jobs taken by the high school graduates. This problem
is not pursued further in this chapter. The last column in Table 5-6
shows the regression coefficient of C004 when the other indepen-
dent variables are LNWK, RC, RJ, and NM. Since other indepen-
dent variables that have greater correlation with ability have been
left out, the figures indicate the maximum effect that C004 could
plausibly exert on earnings. The size of the effect remains small
at all schooling levels.
Consider next the more specific skills, R410 (arithmetic computa-
tion) and R430 (clerical checking). Not surprisingly, at this early
point in earnings careers when people have not yet acquired
highly job-specific skills from experience, these skill variables
have a stronger effect on earnings than the broader-based ability
measures and thus are probably better indicators of differences in
current productivity than the ability measures. These measured
skills probably increase personal productivity in a number of occu-
pations, but not in all. Differences in the distribution of jobs by
educational level may explain why the skill coefficients tend to be
smaller for theandcohorts.
Although these skills appear to be associated with modest earn-
ings differentials, they are not highly correlated with schooling
attainment. Omitting them is therefore unlikely to be a significant
source of bias in estimating returns from schooling.
Results fromThe NBER-Thorndikesample includes white males who took and
Thorndike Datapassed a battery of tests given by the United States Army Air Force
to prospective pilots and navigators during World War II. Earn-
ings data and additional information were obtained from question-
naires in 1955 and 1969. The results discussed here eliminate pro-
prietors, teachers, pilots, and farmers and restrict attention to those
born in the period 192 1—1925 (which overlaps the Rogers sample).
The means and standard deviations of earnings and the test
battery score means of the standard background variables are
shown in Table 5-7. They follow patterns by schooling level thatEducation, income, and human behavior140
TABLE 5-7Means and standard deviationsof log earnings, ability, and background variables by










































* Numbersin parentheses are standard deviations.
f Sample size is for 1969 earnings. Sample sizes for the original 1955 earnings for the six education classes
are 475, 520, 873, 209, 105, and 36.
SOURCE:Author's computations are from NBER-Thorndike data.
resemble the Rogers and Project Talent data. The six schooling
classes are Et, high school graduate; some college; college
graduate with one degree; Et, college graduate with two or more
degrees; lawyer; and doctor. The last three classes are
mutually exclusive. Because of the higher investment in profes-
sional training required by lawyers and physicians, these two oc-
cupations are distinguished for separate analysis. The ability mea-
sure TST43 is a composite of 17 Air Force tests taken in 1943.
These statistics are from a subsample of people born between 1922
and 1925. Consequently, virtually everyone in this subsample had
completed high school when ability was measured, whereas rela-
tively few had higher schooling attainment at that time. This means
that measured ability differentials in this sample cannot be attri-
buted to schooling differentials prior to the testing in 1943.
The background variables include father's education (FEDH
1 if father had at least a college degree, and FEDL = 1 if father did
not graduate from high school), religion (RC = 1 if Catholic, and
RJ = 1 if Jewish), marital status (NM = 1 if not married in 1969),
and region (S = 1if from U.S. Office of Education Region 5—
Southeast).Ability and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings141
In1969 the logarithmic mean earnings for Et through the Et
schooling attainment levels rise consistently and continue to rise
for the two professions of law and medicine. One minor reversal
of this pattern occurs in the original earnings means in 1955, where
those with two or more college degrees (Et) earned about 7 percent
less than those with one college degree. This irregularity may well
reflect the relatively limited earnings experience in 1955 of those
with high levels of formal education. The ability measure TST43
rises significantly with schooling attainment over the first four
schooling classes.It does not separate the schooling levels (in
terms of the extent to which one standard deviation of the test
score overlaps the mean score from adjacent levels) as strongly
as the Rogers and Project Talent samples because initial screening
had already been imposed before these men were given the battery
of AirForcetests. More specifically, this factor means that high
school graduates in this sample have atypically high measured
ability.
Table 5-8 shows the ability variable coefficients from regressions
of the logarithm of earnings on TST43 and background variables
= (FEDH, FEDL, RC, RJ, NM, S). Several patterns in these
coefficients are strikingly similar to the results from Rogers's data
in Table 5-3. In 1969 the coefficient for the group having some col-
lege is less than the coefficient for either high school graduates or
college graduates, and it has lower statistical significance. The co-
efficient increases substantially for those with two or more college
degrees over those with a single degree. This increase is much more
dramatic in the Thorndike sample and is statistically highly signifi-
cant. The two professional groups are small samples, which yield
coefficients that lie between those for one-degree and two-degree
college graduates, but closer to the one-degree level.
The tendency for ability coefficients to increase over time within
schooling level is another common characteristic of the Thorndike
and Rogers samples. (Compare the 1955-to-1965 increase in Table
5-4 with the 1955-to-1969 change in Table 5-8.) A substantial
increase in the ability coefficient of high school graduates is ob-
served in both samples. The substantial increases for lawyers and
doctors resemble more closely the Rogers E5 class (which includes
doctors and lawyers) than the Thorndike Et class (which excludes
them). The 1955 coefficient for the Thorndike college graduates
with two or more degrees seems surprisingly large. For comparable
















































* Numbersin parentheses are standard errors. The bracketed figures are the product
of the TST43 coefficient and one standard deviation of the test score by schooling
level. The ability variables had a different scaling in the original data, and the co-
efficients were not multiplied by 100.
t Sample sizes for 1955 earnings regressions are slightly smaller than those for 1969
given in the table because of prior rejection of extreme observations. For these six
education classes, they are 475, 520, 873, 209, 102, and 36.
SOURCE:Author's computations are from NBER.Thorndike data.
smaller earnings differential associated with one standard devia-
tion of measured ability (within schooling level) than the Rogers
data. However, at the highest schooling level—two or more college
degrees—both samples suggest a 13 or 14 percent earnings differ-
ential with this much variation in ability.
Taking the sample means of TST43 for Et, and Et in-
dividuals and multiplying them by the ability coefficients for col-
lege graduates with one degree and with two or more degrees leads
to figures indicating that neglect of ability differences results in
overstating the potential earnings gains to (average) terminal high
school graduates by 2.8 and 11.1 percent, respectively. This is a
substantial understatement of the bias for the population, since
the Thorndike high school graduates had unusually high ability
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Results from
Husén's Data
The Husén sample includes some 450 Swedish males who were
third graders in Malmo when originally tested in 1938 and who
answered a questionnaire in 1964. Earnings data were obtained
by searching records of past income tax returns.
Table 5-9 summarizes the available earnings data and back-
ground variables by schooling attainment. The seven schooling
levels are Ei', folkskola completed (folkskolaisthe Swedish
elementary school); folkskola completed (usually at age 14);
some realskola (secondary school); realexamen (realskola
completed usually at age 16 or 17) and technical school graduate;
Es', studentexamen (completion of the gymnasium, roughly junior
college, at ages 19 to 21); university degree (excluding Eq;
and physician or dentist. The ability measure TST38 is the
total score from four subtests and is highly similar in content to
IQ tests. The background variables include dummy variables for
social class (SCJ-I"— 1for the highest of four classes of a discrete


















































































a Earnings means are deflated by the Swedish Consumer Price Index (1949 = 100).
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
bNis for 1968 earnings and all other nonearnings variables, and was lower in earlier






SOURCE:Author's computations are from data in Husén Swedish sample.Ability and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings145
attendance in 1938 (PS =1),never married (NM1), and ser-
ious prolonged illness during the late teens or thereafter (PHL TH =
1).
As Table 5-9 indicates, by 1968 (mean age 40) there are large
differentials in earnings between some of the educational levels,
with the more highly educated obtaining greater earnings. The table
includes only those who responded to the 1964 questionnaire, and
response bias may be partially responsible for the slightly higher
mean of log-earnings for El' over Es'; another calculation not limited
to questionnaire respondents yielded mean log-earnings for
and El' of 9.401 and 9.320, respectively, in 1968. At the time
members of this sample were in school, the Swedish educational
system was organized strongly in the continental tradition, under
which relatively few people obtain high levels of education. Most
children terminated their formal study with the completion of the
folkskola (elementary school) at the age of 14. The attrition rate
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obtainedthe secondary realexamen degree (or equivalent past-
folks kola degree from more vocationally oriented alternatives).
This difference in educational systems probably explains why
there is such a modest tendency for the 1938 test score to rise after
(realexamen) is achieved in this sample (except for the small
group—highly trained physicians and dentists). There is a very
strong tendency for the highest socioeconomic class to become an
increasingly important source of students attaining schooling
beyond
Almost all the direct schooling costs at the university level were
absorbed by the Swedish government, and university admission
was limited almost entirely to people who passed the student-
exanzen (i.e., attained level Es'). In this sample, slightly over a
third of those passing studentexamen achieved a university degree
and Ej). These facts indicate that a relatively small proportion
of those with middle and low socioeconomic backgrounds found it
worthwhile getting a university degree even if they passed the
studentexamen. In turn, this result suggests that those terminating
formal education with the studentexamen did not believe that the
higher earnings of university graduates were enough to offset the
out-of-pocket living costs incurred while studying at the university
and the opportunity cost of forgone earnings. Thus it may be that
the investment motive for higher earnings played a less-important
role in Sweden than in the United States in determining university
attendance during this period.
Table 5-10 shows the pattern of the ability (TST38) coefficient
by schooling attainment over time. Other independent variables
are (SCH",SCL", PS, NM", PHLTH). All ability co-
efficients are positive for 1968, although the statistical significance
of the individual coefficients is low. The pattern of coefficients
over time and across schooling levels is much less regular than the
comparable calculations from Rogers's data. This irregularity
may be due partly to the very small size of the samples (especially
for E'1' and Eg) and to earnings statistics' being based on actual
annual earnings instead of the full-time annual equivalent earnings
(or controls for weeks worked) available in the other samples. It
appears that measured ability plays a more important role for
EZ andthan for the lowerandlevels. The size of the
ability coefficient is surprisingly large forin 1964 and 1959,
where a change of one standard deviation in the test score is as-













































































* Numbersin parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients and standard errors are
multiplied by 100. The bracketed figures are the product of the TST38 coefficient
and one standard deviation of TST38 by schooling level, and are notmultiplied
by 100.
t This column gives regression coefficients on lQ measured in 1948, 10 years after
the original tests. The scaling is different from that in the 1938 tests, and so the
coefficients are not strictly comparable, although the bracketed products are.
$: Sample size 12.
§ Sample size 22.
SOURCE:Author's computations are from data in Swedish sample.
peculiar apparent drop in this coefficient in 1968 is a small puzzle
not yet resolved.
The modalclass (folkskola graduate) deserves serious atten-
tion because of the relatively large sample size of 235 (in 1968).
Both the empirical magnitude and statistical significance of the
ability coefficients are trivial for all years, indicating the small
role played by measured cognitive capacity in determining earnings
for members of this group. Special vocational schools, trade
schools, correspondence courses, and the like are more important
in Sweden than in the United States for teaching market-relevant
skills. It is conceivable that there is a wide distribution of invest-
ment in such training not highly correlated with cognitive ability
that tends to mask the ability variable, a hypothesis that will be
tested soon with these data. The apparent decline in the abilityEducation, income, and human behavior148
coefficientin 1968, if genuine and maintained in subsequent years,
is compatible with the conjecture that at this modest level of formal
schooling, job performance can be mastered with experience to the
point where marginal returns to measured ability are negligible.
However, the larger positive, though small, effect of IQ as measured
in 1948 on 1968 earnings indicates that the influence of ability
does persist even at the level.
SummaryofThedata examined in this chapter imply that measures of cognitive
Empiricalability are associated with an empirically significant, but modest,
increase in annual earnings for those with high levels of schooling.
In the three samples with earnings data for people with 15 or 20
years of earnings experience, ability coefficients are found at some
level of advanced schooling for which one standard deviation of
measured ability (within schooling level) is associated with an earn-
ings differential of at least 11 percent. At lower levels of schooling
attainment, measures of cognitive ability have a weaker association
with earnings, becoming completely negligible for high school
nongraduates or, in the Swedish sample, for those who have not
obtained some training at the secondary (realskola) level.
In the three United States samples there appears to be a distinct
tendency for the ability coefficients in earnings regressions to in-
crease with labor force experience. The temporal pattern for the
high school coefficients is especially relevant in considering possible
bias in the opportunity cost (forgone earnings) of getting a college
degree. For early years in the earnings profile, the ability coefficient
is very small, and in most cases not statistically significant. This
result implies that bias from this source is negligible. For those
with 15 or more years of earnings experience, there is a more sig-
nificant bias if ability differences are disregarded. Taking the
product of the differences between the sample means of ability for
two schooling levels and the regression coefficient on ability for
the higher of the levels yields the bias in predicting the expected
increase in earnings from the schooling increment to a person with
the mean ability of those terminating schooling at the lower level.
This calculation indicates a positive bias of 13 and 18 percent
for average high school graduates who obtain one or several college
degrees (Rogers's sample); the corresponding biases implied by
the Thorndike data are (at least) 2.8 and 11.1 percent.
The modest contribution of measured ability in explaining the
differences in earnings, in contrast with the strong association of
measured ability and final schooling attainment, is not very sur-Ability and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings149
prisingsince most of the ability measures considered here are
designed to forecast academic potential and achievement. The
coefficients of determination of the within-schooling-class regres-
sions are low, and (more important) the standard deviations of
the residuals continue to be large, despite the homogeneity imposed
by narrow age range, criteria for omitting observations, and the
sets of background variables included in the regressions. In no
regression of annual log-earnings does the standard deviation fall
below .24. The task of identifying the main determinants of this
residual variation remains a major challenge to students of the
distribution of earnings.
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